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Commentary:
he time is more than ripe for
Maryland to abolish the outdated
tenets of contributory negligence
and join with her forty-five sister states in
adopting the modern doctrine of comparative negligence. Currently, Maryland
law embodies the doctrine of contributory
negligence, the "all or nothing rule," that
bars recovery to an injured plaintiff who
is found to be even a scintilla at fault. The
Maryland Court of Appeals has again left
it up to the legislature to initiate a change
in the law by refusing to adopt comparative negligence in Harrison v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456
A.2d 894 (1983) (quadriplegic student denied recovery after failing to properly
execute a front flip in his school gymnasium). The 1986 Maryland Legislature
must adopt the modified form of comparative negligence proposed in Senate
Bill 589 (SB 589, 1986 Sess.) ("SB 589") in
order to remedy the inequities evidenced
by Harrison and abolish a law that is patently unfair.
Senate Bill 589 plans to adopt the modified form of comparative negligence that
would not permit a person's contributory
negligence to be a complete bar to recovery
if the contributory negligence was less than
the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought. One's damage award
would be diminished in the proportion of
the percentage of contributory negligence
attributable to that person. Senate Bill 589
remains unchanged from similar bills that
have failed in the past two legislative sessions. However, significant progress has
been made by our legislature in these last
two sessions since the introduction of such
a bill nearly twenty years ago. Two years
ago marked the first time that the bill
moved out of the Senate and the first time
since 1968 that a comparative negligence
bill moved from one house to the other
(dying in the House Judiciary Committee
by a vote of 12 to 9). Last year's bill passed
on the Senate floor (41-3) then passed in
the House Judiciary Committee (12-9) before being defeated on the House floor by a
narrow margin (66-53). The 1986 legislature must complete the trend toward adopting comparative negligence.
Why would forty-five states convert to
comparative negligence except for the basic
premise that the law of contributory negligence is outdated and its "all or nothing"
approach is patently unfair? These strong
policy reasons must be kept in the fore-
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front of each legislator's decision-making
process. The major threats to SB 589 are
the skepticism over jury verdicts, the threat
of increased litigation, the powerful insurance lobby, and the effects on other areas
of tort law.
Generally, the skepticism over jury verdicts is unfounded. There has been no dependable evidence from any state that has
adopted a comparative negligence standard
that juries have had any difficulty apportioning harm by percentages to the respective parties. In fact, SB 589 provides for an
explanatory jury instruction. Juries have
the knowledge to understand the ramifications of their decisions before apportioning fault. Opponents to SB 589 have argued
that, under our present system, juries apply a rough comparative negligence standard and compromise their verdicts. Opponents say, "Why fix a machine that is
not broken?" This goes against the fundamental policies of our judicial system.
Judges give instructions to be adhered to,
not compromised. Even if this rough comparative negligence standard is true, many
actionable claims that would go to the jury
under a comparative negligence standard
are not given the chance under the contributory negligence standard due to summary
judgments and directed verdicts. Furthermore, many claims are never filed because
the injured person is slightly at fault.
Injured plaintiffs maintaining meritorious
claims must be given access to the courts
instead of being thwarted by the law of
contributory negligence.
The second apparent concern is the
threat of increased litigation. Because the
adoption of a comparative negligence standard is a recent phenomenon, there has not
been sufficient research on its effects. It is
important to note that SB 589 only provides
recovery to one whose negligence is less
than the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought. Therefore, the
"less than" standard may inhibit fraudulent claims for fear that the person bringing suit may be found to be more at fault
and subject to a counterclaim by the opposing party. Hence, there is an inherent
mechanism to insure that only valid claims
may increase. Justice requires and encourages the maintenance of valid claims. Furthermore, no significant increase in litigation has been noted by any comparative
negligence state.
A third concern comes from the powerful insurance lobby. These opponents to
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the comparative negligence standard argue
that the number of claims and the number
of successful claims will increase, thereby
causing an increase in rates. It must be emphasized that there is no dependable data
to support the insurance lobbyists' contentions. Our Maryland Legislature must shy
away from the unsubstantiated fears of the
strong insurance lobby and lean toward a
statute that benefits the well-being of the
citizens of our State. If insurance companies will be affected by comparative
negligence at all, it is by set-offs; that is,
set-offs will play an important role in the
ultimate division of damages.
Finally, there are concerns that other
areas of tort law such as strict liability in
tort, assumption of risk, last clear chance
and settlements by joint tortfeasors will be
affected if comparative negligence legislation is adopted. However, as Judge Rita
Davidson stated in her dissent in Harrison,
any discrepancies with any other areas of
tort law can be adequately resolved by our
judicial system if not legislatively corrected. Just as was done in every other
comparative negligence state, Maryland
can effect a needed tort reform by a smooth
legislative and judicial transition.
The time for change is now. Legislative
action must be taken in this 1986 session
in order to remedy the obvious inequities
inherent in the doctrine of contributory
negligence. Opponents ofSB 21 have not
adequately substantiated their reasons
against acceptance of a comparative negligence standard so as to outweigh the reasons for its adoption. Juries will be able to
apportion fault, only meritorious claims
will increase, no attributable rise in insurance rates has been noted by any other
comparative negligence state, and a smooth
tort reform can be accomplished. Let us
join our 45 sister states in adopting the
doctrine of comparative negligence and
abolish a rule that is patently unfair.
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